The Silent Breach: How ‘Harvest Now, Decrypt Later’ Is Forcing Australia’s Quantum Reckoning
The Breach That Has Already Happened
Somewhere in an adversary’s archive, sensitive encrypted information belonging to an Australian government agency, business, or critical infrastructure operator is already sitting, waiting. It cannot be read yet. But it is being stored for the day when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) can break the encryption that protects it. This is not a future scenario; it is the operational reality of the “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy, and it has fundamentally altered the timeline for quantum risk.
Why the Risk Timeline Is Shorter Than the Technology Timeline
The precise arrival date of a CRQC remains uncertain, but the exposure window is not defined by that date. The risk begins when the data is intercepted. For information that must remain confidential for five, ten, or twenty years—health records, source code, merger and acquisition activity, regulated personal information—the compromise is already in motion. The Australian Department of Home Affairs has warned that encrypted data intercepted today may be exposed as early as 2028.
This means that quantum readiness is not a future-proofing exercise. It is a present-tense data protection imperative. Organisations that have not mapped where their long-lived sensitive data resides and how it is encrypted are operating with an invisible liability that compounds with every passing day.
The Organisational Blind Spot
Despite the clarity of the threat, preparedness remains low. Research commissioned by Certes found that while 73% of Australian organisations are assessing the impact of harvest now, decrypt later attacks, only 5% have a defined quantum security strategy. The gap between awareness and execution is the space in which adversaries operate.
The ASD recommends a minimum viable response: organisations should already understand what sensitive information they hold, how long it needs to remain confidential, and where it is stored and transmitted. A Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) is an essential first step, providing visibility into the vulnerable algorithms scattered across enterprise systems, operational technology, and third-party services.
Building Resilience Beyond Encryption
Quantum readiness extends beyond replacing algorithms. It requires resilience across data, identities, applications, networks, cloud environments, operational technology, IoT, and embedded technologies. The CSIRO’s Quantum Readiness project is developing an evidence-based methodology to assess organisational preparedness across these dimensions, providing a structured way for industries to identify gaps and prioritise investments.
